“The sardonic and sinister figure of Lord Kitchener bestrides India. We dislike his brutal and domineering methods”
Times of India 22nd August 1905
Peter King’s book The Viceroy’s Fall rather confirmed my pre-disposition to look unfavourably on the alleged achievements of Kitchener although some may feel that I lacked objectivity in choosing to read a book that clearly holds him in low regard. Some might also suggest that it is unwise to attach importance to a book that seemed to have escaped any serious proof-reading prior to publication; in particular, it almost beggars belief that a book devoted to a military man should, spell his rank thus: Field Marshall. But the book is littered with spelling mistakes, including: ‘preapred’ (prepared); ‘wil’ (will); and ‘subejet’ (subject). The book also contains some curious inaccuracies, as in the case of William Nicholson who apparently died in 1910 only to become a Field Marshal in 1911 and in 1916 served on the Royal Commission on the Dardanelles. All that said, those observations are outweighed by the sheer weight of researched evidence that Herbert Kitchener was not a ‘good bloke’.
Background
“One of those revolving lighthouses which radiate momentary gleams of revolving light far out into the surrounding gloom, and then suddenly relapse into complete darkness. There were no intermediate stages” Lloyd George on Kitchener
The battle between Lord Curzon, Viceroy of India and Kitchener was over the constitutional issue of the separation of the Army from the civilian power and the superiority of the latter. In recognition of the importance of the fundamental issue Winston Churchill offered this contemporaneous view: “I cannot believe a Liberal Government will allow the Commander-in-Chief in India to engross to himself so much power.” In order to achieve absolute power in India the evidence suggests that Kitchener was a manipulative schemer of Machiavellian proportions.
K The Plotter
“Do not exaggerate, do not flatter; do not slander; do not impute; but turn naturally to truth as the magnet flies to the pole” Lord Curzon on truth in public life
If we are to believe Lord Esher, Kitchener took a rather different view of how to play the game: “He [Kitchener] was admirably equipped with a few simple precepts and with illimitable patience, not untinged by the methods the Israelites inherited from Jacob, and the statesmen of the Renaissance from Machiavelli.”
Kitchener took an unsporting view of ‘playing the game’, taking a long-term view of winning. While in Sudan, he created a coterie of young men loyal to his cause nicknamed ‘the Boys’ or ‘the band of Boys’ who then moved with Kitchener to South Africa (The Boer War). On his arrival in India, Kitchener had already placed some of the Boys in crucially influential staff posts in London and subsequently fixed ADC appointments to reinforce his network. In effect, he created an espionage network throughout the military and, in due course, political structures.
To achieve his ends in the political sphere, Kitchener deployed his manufactured, none-the-less effective, charm to influence the Great & Famous (G&F) and frequently corresponded to them in the interests of his cause. In particular, he focused on the wives of the G&F such as Lady Salisbury and, incredibly, Lady Curzon. As Peter King put it: “His [Kitchener] charm was never wasted on underdogs.”. As with any successful plotter, Kitchener needed to maintain security and this he largely achieved with the use of codes and cyphers in letters and telegrams that were circulated throughout his personal network. As an additional security measure, the civilian postal service, rather than the official military or Foreign Office one, was utilised for the circulation of some sensitive information.
General Sir Ian Hamilton succinctly summarised the motivation for Kitchener’s actions: “The outcome of a never ending struggle between his common-sense and a mania for secrecy which almost always got the upper hand…..[Kitchener] longed to exhibit himself to the world, but could not because he was afraid of it, afraid of what it might think of the of the inner thoughts and restrained passions of Herbert Kitchener.” Kitchener’s obsession with security extended to demanding certain letters should be destroyed once read.
Military Effectiveness
“Kitchener of Chaos” Sir Power Palmer
Consideration of Kitchener’s performance in either India or the Sudan lies beyond the scope of this short article, rather its purpose is to view the longer-term impact of Kitchener’s wheeze to increase his power within India (i.e., the battle with Curzon over the supremacy of civilian power in India). Further, although Kitchener’s eventual goal was to become Viceroy of India that too is not relevant to thoughts on the impact of his reforms to military effectiveness. What is pertinent however, is the disastrous performance of the Indian Army in Mesopotamia that added some credence to the Arab Proverb that states: ‘After Allah made hell he thought he could improve on it, and made Mesopotamia by adding flies.”.
In Peter King’s book, the only forceful vindication of Kitchener’s military performance is offered by Professor Norman Dixon[i] in his book The Psychology of Military Incompetence in which he states that Kitchener was: “A highly competent commander”. However, King dismisses that assessment by suggesting Dixon had not read the Government Inquiry into the campaign in Mesopotamia (1914).
Although the campaign took place after Kitchener had long gone, the Indian Army force was deployed, structured and trained in accordance with Kitchener’s reforms. The Government Inquiry confirmed what was already widely appreciated – those reforms had a deleterious impact on military operations. The Secretary of State – Austen Chamberlain commented thus on the Mesopotamia Campaign Enquiry: “I agree that the Military system established in India by Lord Kitchener has finally broken down”. A further comment from the Report stated that: “The present Army [Kitchener] system in India has not only broken down but has been positively mischievous”.
Later Trevor Royle observed in his Biography on the disastrous Mesopotamian Campaign that: “The new machine contained as many flaws as the old……60,000 men of the Indian Army put Kitchener’s methods to the test during the Mesopotamian Campaign which ended in disaster and carnage…as much due to bad leadership, cabinet indecision and the superior Turkish forces as it was to the system created by Lord Kitchener”. It seems extraordinary, for example, that the Expeditionary Force deployed without any light machine guns but, perversely, with 650 mules without carts – presumably creating a mammoth fodder requirement for animals of minimal operational value.
Arthur Balfour while Secretary of State for War wrote this in a note: “[Kitchener] was hopelessly incapable of facing the greatness of the crisis”. That Balfour, with his reputation for indolence particularly in letter writing, should make the effort to pick up his pen, suggests that his judgement represents more than a whim. Whereas Lord Esher merely developed the belief of other commentators that “Kitchener drew on Machiavelli to achieve his ends”.
K The Man
“He drinks, and has the other failing acquired by most of the Egyptian officers, a taste for buggery” Major AE Wearne MC, Reuter’s correspondent
Kitchener, early in his career, revealed a propensity for cruelty and vindictiveness. In 1898 his action of digging up the remains of the Mahdi from his tomb (General Gordon’s nemesis) and planning to polish the skull as a desk ornament shocked many, including Queen Victoria. In due course he abandoned the ghoulish plan.
Soon after In South Africa, when Kitchener assumed his civilian role in addition to his military one, the death toll in the Concentration Camps rose, particularly among women and children. As King reveals: “The toll of casualties in the camps rose, mainly women and children, was three times the Boer casualties in the war.”
Kitchener also appeared to excel in that sub-division of cruelty – bullying. Philip Magnus, quoted in The Viceroy’s Fall, offers this insight into that trait: “..he [Kitchener] might remain morose and silent for hours on end. He was difficult with his staff, and often vented his spleen by bullying them as other men bully their wives. This was made much worse by his total incapacity to delegate even simple things…”.
In the round, Lord George Hamilton perhaps offers the insight that is the most relevant to those obliged to work with or under Kitchener: “Kitchener is very unpopular; his manner is most ungracious and he is very inconsiderate in his treatment of subordinates”.
K The Looter
Although looting and good old fashioned corruption are character traits, it seemed appropriate to offer a separate section to them. While accepting that, even in more recent times, including my own, corruption reared its ugly head, Kitchener seems to have engaged in it on an industrial scale. Peter King offers these examples:
“Kitchener had helped himself to a good deal of private loot from South Africa, including statues of Boer leaders, which he had removed from their cities to decorate the ground of the large country house he intended to buy and beautify” and “Kitchener’s ‘taste for art’ took the form of acute kleptomania”.
What former Service folk might find the most disagreeable is the misemployment of military personnel since the wherewithal to so do generally lies in the hands of those in the upper echelons and it smacks of bullying or, at best, the abuse of power. Few subordinates are brave enough to say to the General “paint your own windows!”. Such considerations did not impinge on Kitchener’s thinking as he employed Royal Engineers to assist in the rebuilding of his country home – Broome Park, Canterbury. Outgoings were not limited to his long-term plans for in India he spent thousands of pounds “beautifying Snowden”, his residence in Simla.
Re-writing History
It cannot be a surprise to learn that a plotter of such Machiavellian proportions who is given to secrecy, should make every effort to conceal the truth surrounding his activities. The production of Departmental Records by a ‘neutral’ author on the departure of a Viceroy was standard practice – in effect a draw-down report. Not until after Kitchener’s death did Curzon discover that report of 232 Pages had been bowdlerised by Kitchener and cut to 184 pages.
This disreputable act prompted Sir Edwin Colln to state: “I hope I may live long enough to see K exposed….I trust that I shall see it, for it is a disgrace to humanity that a creature so devoid of any sense of honour should be permitted to impose on the English people”. He was not alone since Lovat Fraser, Editor of The Times of India wrote to Curzon: “I cannot conceive anything more vindictive, and – I think one may say – dishonourable.”
Lovat later agreed to take on the task of taking a more objective view of Kitchener but this pronouncement hardly made a strong case for looking favourably on Kitchener: “K began honestly enough (in the first month or so) as far as a man with his peculiarly perverted sense of political morality is capable of honesty at all. What I mean is that originally he cannot have intended to stoop to the depths to which he afterwards descended.”
[i] The Psychology of Military Incompetence was savaged in the British Army Review (BAR) suggesting that Dixon knew little about such matters. It was subsequently pointed out that Dixon had been a Bomb Disposal Officer in WW2 and had been awarded an MBE for bravery. The BAR’s Editor later wrote a public apology which, as far as I know, remains a unique action. Professor Dixon was a charming man who freely offered his advice/opinion when asked and also wrote the very readable, if slightly disconcerting book, Our Own Worst Enemy.
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