NOT LEADERSHIP

 

“Can’t the b—– fools at home realise that we are fighting against a perfectly glorious army led by real generals and soldiers, and nothing but the best is of any use whatever.”                                                                                                                                                    Brigadier-General Henry Wilson, 1914

Introduction

The study of leadership consumes much of the Services’ time-in fact to such an extent that it might be in danger of becoming a self-contained intellectual exercise. Over the years a daunting array of leadership qualities has been postulated; for example, the Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth used to suggest no less than fifteen, including cheerfulness (if, having mastered the other fourteen, naval officers can remain cheerful they deserve the accolade of leader). The apparent levity of these remarks should not be misconstrued. The need for leadership qualities, and their display, is a well-established one and as John Keegan said: “It is, however, nonsensical indifferentism to suppose that individual qualities count for nothing in the way the world works.” None-the-less, history offers certain dangers in over intellectualising the study of war and leadership: ” … the Staff College culture which informed their [the First World War armies] leadership had, by a bogus scientism, so sanctified the importance of purely theoretical principles of war­ making, and consequently so depreciated the importance of human emotion, that the common soldiers were not thought worth the expenditure of their commanders’ breath. ”

Most of those in authority have views on leadership; even Captain Mainwaring offered a useful tip: “Always know when to unbend“.  This is no surprise, for such an intangible subject allows hours of fruitful (?) unfettered debate, often free of both recrimination and proof of error. The Great and Famous (G&F) have recorded their various leadership recipes for inclusion in the Services’ cookery books but, disturbingly for the dedicated student, there does not seem to be uniform view either between the Services or among the G&F.

This is all good clean fun and this author would be the last person to remove fun from the curriculum of military life (some might suggest that it has already been eroded too far). Indeed he has to confess not only to joining the debate through the production of a widely unread article but also to retaining a pathetic attachment to three rarely mentioned qualities: fairness, a knowledge of one’s own limitations, time management and emotional commitment. Such an attachment is not totally groundless. Emotional commitment was an attribute of one of our greatest Generals: ” … not the only example of Wellington’s genuine tenderness of heart, exhibited in the quiet days of peace as well as on the morrow of a tragic victory.”  As for an awareness of limitations, Keegan offers some tangential support: “What they should not know of him [the leader] must be concealed at all costs” 7 from which it may be inferred that a leader must first identify his weaknesses before he can hide them from the led. Finally, support for fairness is to be found in Serve to Lead and perhaps it is worth remembering that the corrupting influence of nepotism or favouritism-the antithesis of fairness­ can and does masquerade under such metaphors as team selection.  As for time, it seems that those who excel in managing it not only are given to good manners but also release the space to talk to subordinates.

The leadership debate is, quite properly, not confined to the military. Recently a psychologist suggested that the requisite qualities for leadership were, in summary:

• Forcefulness
• The ability to lie, make excuses and deny successfully (the last supports the ‘mechanism of denial’ system attributed to Lieutenant General Warren’s leadership style in the Boer War).
• Imagination
• Sobriety
• A capacity for dark moods

These may not find favour in military circles!

Thus leadership has been well examined and it is to be hoped that the goal of all leaders, both embryonic and extant, is to develop “The ability to get other people to do what they do not want to do and like it” – President Truman.  The pleasing aspects of the President’s definition of leadership are its brevity, its lack of pretentious analysis and trendy qualities, its results-orientated message and its reference to the subordinates’ morale (ie ” … and like it“). Encouragingly the Royal Navy’s Command pamphlet on the practice of leadership is entitled: Getting Things Done-but one can only surmise as to President Truman’s influence on that choice of title. Whatever the merits of results-based leadership it might be unnerving to extend the principle too far: “He [the General] may be owed obedience only for as long as his decisions bring victory, the uneasy lot of Generals in the Boer Free States.”

The foregoing is a clear manifestation of how easy it is to slip into a debate on leadership and that is not the real purpose of this article. It is the position of the subordinate which this contribution seeks to address, specifically the man at the bottom of the pile, the man on whom all the multifarious qualities of leadership are brought to bear, in fact the Gunner (that is to say, the equivalent to Private or Trooper in less well-established Regiments), hereafter referred to as the “soldier”. Where the terms management or manager(s) are used they cover the entire rank range from Lance Bombardier to Field Marshal.

A term was needed to describe the matter in hand and Non Leadership started as the working title although, in truth, Followership is as good an adaptation as any (invention cannot be claimed since it has been coined by Mrs Margaret Thatcher, admittedly in another context); further, it seemed to be preferable to Leadership. This new word requires defining and, in the context of this article, Followership may be regarded as: the soldier’s perception of management and leaders.

Background

As part of the initial research into followership I hailed a passing academic and enquired as to whether, to his knowledge, the subject had been addressed. Not as far as he could recall was the essence of his response but he did suggest that I should “try grand maison“. Possessed of a soupçon of schoolboy French, not wishing to display my true ignorance and convinced that grand maison was a vogue euphemism (of the type so beloved by those in the forefront of military thinking) for the library; thence I repaired. Further enquiry revealed that there was, in fact, a Colonel Grandmaison of the French Army who seemingly only recorded his good works in his native tongue. This article has, therefore, been based on imagination (prejudice?) and sources other than Grandmaison.

The Unfortunate Precedents of History

“We are at equal risk from the enemy and those planners behind in the remoteness of safety.”

Consider the First World War soldier locked in the cellar of the chain of command; even in the First World War there were many floors above him:

THE WAR COMMITTEE

CHIEF OF THE IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, BEF (Usually a Field Marshal)                                                       

ARMY COMMANDER (General)

CORPS COMMANDER (Lieutenant General)

DIVISIONAL COMMANDER (Major General)

BRIGADE COMMANDER (Brigadier)

UNIT COMMANDER – BATTALION OR REGIMENT    (Lieutenant Colonel)

SUB UNIT COMMANDER – BATTERY OR SQUADRON OR COMPANY  (Major/Captain)

PLATOON OR TROOP COMMANDER (Captain or Lieutenant)

SECTION COMMANDER (Bombardier or Corporal)

The type of chain of command depicted above should offer no particular surprise to readers of military journals but little harm can flow from being reminded of its potentially imposing nature (even more so if Majors, Warrant Officers and all the other NCO ranks are added to the depiction). It is also worth remembering that the chain is possibly even more intimidating in 1991, or at least more confusing. Now the chain is extended and complicated by, as Richard Ingrams of Private Eye might say, foreign chappies. Up on the highest floors are Americans and Germans–an observation rather than a xenophobic criticism, and as multinational forces become a reality the matrix will surely become yet more confusing (not just for the soldier).

Simpler though the First World War chain of command may have been as compared to the present, its effects did not please all:

“It was pure bloody murder. Douglas Haig should have been hung (sic), drawn and quartered   for what he did on the Somme. The cream of British manhood was shattered in less than six hours.”

“I cursed, and still do, the generals who caused us to suffer such torture, living in filth, eating filth, and then, death or injury just to boost their ego.”

Historical examples are not confined to the Great War:

” … the campaign [Crimea] plumbed depths of incompetence never before attempted.”  Attempting incompetence is an interesting notion and reminiscent of one of Oscar Wilde’s gems:  “They show a want of knowledge that must be the result of years of study“.

“… [an Army] too rigid and lacking in flexibility to be really adaptable to the conditions of  modern quick-moving warfare in the Desert, or even elsewhere.” General Auchinleck

“Better that men should die and cities be overrun than that the sacred teachings should be found wanting.”

We must, in fairness, assume that the lessons of history have been absorbed; or should we?  In 1985 Richard Simpkin stated that:

“The British and French attitude, which still prevails on one side of the Channel and persisted until quite recently on the other, probably results from the way soldiers’ blood and courage have proved more readily available in those two countries than Generals’ brains … the enduring if quaint conviction that blood-letting is good for the nation’s health.”

It would be dispiriting, and probably wrong, to think that progress has not been made in humanising and raising the effectiveness of the chain of command but the lessons of history ought regularly to be called to mind. Not only is the chain long but it is also likely to become even more complicated. Therefore, it has to work with sensitivity and be readily understood, otherwise the wheel may turn full circle in the less­ dense/non-linear battlefield of the future:

“One of the controversies of the First World War was the extent to which the ordinary soldier lost faith in his generals … a conflict between the policy adopted by the generals and the attitude of the men in the trenches.”

The Pressures on the Soldier

“The method of imposing the will of one nation upon another may in time be replaced purely by psychological warfare, wherein weapons are not even used on the battlefield, but instead the corruption of the human mind, the dimming of the intellect and the disintegration of the moral and spiritual fibre of one nation by the will of another are accomplished.”                                                                                 V I Lenin, 1921

The diagram above [To follow] and Figure one below [To follow] represent an attempt to portray graphically the potential psychological pressures on the soldier. It should be appreciated that they are not pressures which are wholly unique to the soldier, nor indeed to the Services. It is probable, however, that they are in whole, or in part, a good deal worse for the soldier. That is not to say that there are not different pressures on management but this debate concerns followership rather than the well-rehearsed topic of leadership.

In explanation of this section, some points need to be made on Figure 1. First, there may be more pressures than those depicted and it is only an aid to the debate; furthermore, since some of the indicated pressures are self-evident they will not be discussed further. Second, peacetime factors are considered since it is in peace that relationships are forged and the framework established, and carried over into war, as implied by both George Hooper and by Field Marshal Slim.  Third, the pressures are sporadic and some will be mutually exclusive at any one time (e.g. boredom is unlikely to set in where the soldier is over-organised). Finally, some may consider the listed pressures to be either contrived or too obvious or even too insignificant. Such criticisms are accepted by the author since he is not a soldier and has, therefore, been required to use his imagination.

It is inevitable that conflicting stresses are placed on soldiers. Not only does the system demand differing qualities as between peace and war but also there is a case for suggesting that each type of warfare requires attributes which fit the circumstances (for example, France’s change to an offensive strategy in the 1880s was central to her heated debate over manning policy); such a thought might have relevance to the predicted non­linear European battlefield with its attendant, as yet unproven, stress. Whatever the peace or war scenario, at times soldiers are required to be compliant, supine, unquestioning, wholesome, well behaved and disciplined, whereas at other times the killer instinct, imitative and outspokenness are wanted. No originality is claimed in espousing this dichotomy, indeed Slim touched on it with more eloquence when considering, who he termed, “the ordinary British soldier“:

“Think for a moment of the soldier’s job. In war he has not only to fight but, in order to be  able to fight, he has continually to perform every activity that goes on in a civilian community, and do it under the most uncomfortable, nerve-racking, and dangerous conditions. In peace he is often called upon to restore order or to carry on essential services when these tasks have proved too difficult for the civilian authorities.”

Superimposed on these, sometimes conflicting, demands is the requirement to cope with modern technology. It may be something of a surprise, therefore, that many of our soldiers do not suffer the dire effects of information overload.

Technology adds a new dimension to this debate. Many tasks are now undertaken by machine; can this be extended and can we opt for an army of near robots? Unfortunately even robots place tiresome demands on management; as far back as 1872 Lewal stated: “Even if modern soldiers are machine-handling robots, they need to be trained to become proficient robots.” Although technology is of great importance, and predicting its development is a rash exercise, it seems most unlikely that wars can be fought by robots. We need soldiers who, if the Lenin-type threat is credible, must be protected against the psychological pressures of the enemy; equally we must minimize those arising from within our own chain of command. In summary: “… it will remain the mind of the trained soldier and that of his leader that is his most important weapon.”  Thus it would seem that the mind of the soldier is a critical asset which needs to be nurtured and guarded.

Further, his “robotization” is not a real option and has been argued against:

” … the soldier cannot be matured in a school that holds the vestiges of the belief that automatic action is the ideal thing in the soldier.”

Nevertheless, instinctive action is required particularly under periods of stress. A recognition of this is surely one of the overriding justifications for training, doctrine, Standard Operating Procedures etc. Thus we provide an essential structured palliative to deal with the insidious threat of stress:

” … the more stressed the more physically incapable the less competent and the less competent the more stressed and so on until death (mercifully) intervenes  ”

Death obviously lies at the extreme end of the spectrum but, particularly in a technological age which demands a consistently high degree of alertness and adaptability, the debilitating effects of stress on, for example, a person’s ability to solve simple mathematical problems is a potential cause for concern. An interim conclusion might be that the use and the protection of the mind of the soldier ought to be kept in balance with the optimization of technology: “Wars are fought with weapons but they are won by men. Man is the prime factor in battle, and victory can only be assured if the individual soldier is prepared to withstand the mental and physical shock of war.”

To satisfy the soldier side of that balance we are perhaps searching for a perfect psychological mix. In Freudian terms, it might be said that we need a man who can control his id (emanations from that primitive part of the brain concerned with basic biological needs and the production of fear). The control of his id might only be regarded as the baseline, since management needs to understand and develop his ego (the progression of the id connecting it with the outside world) and his super ego (moral attitudes and behaviour). Where id may be the fundamental target for training, again there is clearly a need for balance; for example, fearless soldiers without any concept of morality would be an unwholesome prospect, not to mention the fear that they might engender in management.

Leadership is unavoidably an essential component of this debate. Aside from the constant changeover of leaders which is inherently disruptive and potentially stressful to the soldier, the actual process of leadership may exert psychological pressures down the chain of command. An aspect of this might be the ‘boss syndrome’ highlighted by the late Lord Vic Feather: “What we want in industry in this country is not bosses but leaders.”29

The leadership process can be aggravated by the “check list” or formula approach-management experimenting with or confirming its recently taught or newly found allegedly requisite qualities. The ;check list’ leader, as opposed to the intuitive results­ orientated one, can inadvertently, even with the best of intentions, introduce unnecessary pressures on the soldier. For example, a leader is exhorted to “Persuade a soldier to recruit while at home? Remind them of the shortage. Tell them to go back to their old ACFs“.  This raises the question: ‘Why should a Serviceman/woman feel obliged to devote part of his/her well-earned leave to recruiting?’ (In any event, the satisfied soldier is probably a better method and the ‘we are short’ message is hardly persuasive or flattering to a potential recruit). On the one hand, an Army would be unwise not to focus much effort on recruiting, particularly in view of demographic trends and projections, and processing and training lead-times. On the other hand retention of the trained and processed soldiers is as important if not more so and yet, certainly in presentational terms, less effort seems to be afforded to it. Perhaps a soldier would feel a little more wanted and cared for in the long term if a Directorate of Retention and Resettlement were to be created.

Management could surely afford to be more conscious of the niggling little pressures arising from human relationships within a hierarchical organisation. Perhaps it should constantly be asking of itself ‘would I like that?’ For example, ‘Would I like somebody to be friendly, cheerful and responsive one day, and authoritarian, dark and introspective on the next?’ or ‘Would I like to be standing to attention publicly answering a raft of personal questions about my family and holiday plans?’ These may appear to be facile examples but they happen and represent, I suggest, a corrosive psychological pressure. Indeed, the former which essentially represents mood changes can be all the more damaging where familiarity has been allowed to over-penetrate management/soldier relationships.

There is no utopian solution for the relationship between leader and led. Perhaps the best the latter can hope for is consistency which, without doubt, is difficult and places demands on the farmer’s equanimity. Tangential to consistency is what might be termed ‘transferred stress’. The higher up the chain of command stress begins the greater the final impact on the soldier. Stress can be multiplied as it passes through each level of the chain. Thus, it is that the bad mood of a G&F can be translated into a raging fury by the time it reaches the soldier.

Authoritarianism deserves separate consideration to leadership, although too often the two become synonymous. Professor Norman Dixon explains the inter-relationship of leader and led in this context, and it would be unwise to try to improve on his words:

“It is a feature of authoritarian hierarchical organizations that career prospects depend, amongst other things, upon swift obedience to orders from above. So, if you are asked to do something, you jump to it. Unlike the exercise of power, which is generally satisfying, such  immediate obedience may not always be enjoyable to the person who does the obeying.  Some people may love to obey and may be whole-hearted in their readiness to act in accordance with the dictates of another. But there are others who obey only because forced   to do so by reason of the fact that their career depends on it. For such individuals manifestations of obedience may well engender considerable conflict. They obey, but         underneath seem to be saying, “Why the hell should I?”

So, some people like to obey and others do not; therein lies an identification and handling challenge for management. Significantly Dixon uses the word ‘conflict’ which could be interpreted as stress. Authoritarianism probably still exists although not many of the management team would admit to it, perhaps preferring to categorize it as positive and energetic leadership. It may be more relevant, however, to suggest that authoritarianism is perceived to exist by the soldier. Real or perceived authoritarianism can threaten Group Cohesion (in the halcyon days of old simply called teamwork), become self-perpetuating the “my turn will come” syndrome and even lead to “fragging” in war. [Fragging is taken to mean the deliberate killing of a superior by a subordinate]

Where a soldier has no belief in a cause, fighting a war would be at best debilitating at worst impossible, since morale, and hence motivation, would quickly collapse. Rightly, therefore, much store is placed in the belief in a cause during the planning and conduct of operations, and in the study of leadership. If, however, we accept (as many do) that the Army has become a job rather than a way of life it could be suggested that a belief in a cause is not particularly relevant in peace; other factors like pay, quality of life, etc might predominate. Of course, it would be reassuring to believe that the defence of the realm and deterrence theories fill the belief vacuum but with the thawed Cold War these causes may have become less persuasive. If the peacetime cause has become dissipated, the corollary might be that in the event of an operation, a belief not only assumes even greater importance than was the case in the “old Army” but also that it may be more difficult to inculcate in the soldier. Fundamental to these considerations is the need to be certain that there is a common under­ standing about what might be termed a cause, from which will flow motivation.

Operations in Northern Ireland (NI) offer a possible case for examination. Management and soldier alike embark on a NI tour full of missionary zeal only to have it eroded by apparently unnecessary and limiting constraints on the conduct of operations, a lack of positive progress and a depressing ambience of sameness. Clearly a soldier’s belief in the NI politico/ military cause cannot and should not be assumed and management may have difficulty in explaining it with satisfactory credibility. When troops first deployed to the Province (1969) the cause may have been interpreted as the protection of the Catholic/Republican community. Initially there was much conviviality between that community and the troops, cups of tea were proffered and the hand of friendship extended. Tragically, and confusingly, friends were soon to become enemies. Had the cause therefore changed? Before trying to answer that question, another example is offered.

In the USA when Congress approved the Volstead Act, Prohibition was imposed (the legal regulation of the manufacture, sale and transportation of alcoholic beverages). Prohibition, which even restricted the medicinal and sacramental uses of alcohol, ran from January 1920 to December 1933. Effecting the provisions became a major activity for the forces of law and order, initially under the control .of the US Treasury Department but after 1927 under the auspices of the Bureau of Prohibition. After fourteen years most of the US law enforcement agencies lost a major task and after seven years the Bureau had no justification for its existence.  Was Prohibition a cause?

To suggest that either the protection of the Catholic community in NJ or the imposition of Prohibition was a cause is surely wrong. Rather, the common cause, worthy of belief especially in a democracy, was (and still is in the case of NI) upholding the law. It could be further suggested that both tasks were merely, in military parlance, missions which are indeed subject to change, however undesirable that may be. One can only speculate as to how many of the management teams in these two scenarios confused the mission with the cause and mis-briefed their soldiers accordingly. (Another interesting speculation might be what would have been the cause had the 1991 Gulf War developed into an invasion of Iraq).

A soldier’s belief in a cause should not be assumed. Recourse to those trusty props of regimental tradition, pride in professionalism and discipline might provide motivation in the short term but they would be unlikely to fill the vacuum in a soldier’s soul under the protracted stress of operations. The soldier must know his mission and the overall cause within which it fits. In order to achieve this, management could usefully ask of itself ‘Do I understand the cause?’

The sensation of timelessness, like a non-credible cause, can create a vacuum. It is in the nature of things that nobody, not even the G&F, can be precise about timings. Management, however, will always have a clearer idea. It knows, for example, the likely duration of an Orders Group or patrol leg or a briefing; the soldier lacks that advantage and is in a time vacuum. It is surely no accident that a favoured aspect of torture is time disorientation. Thus, by concealing timings, where they are known, management is, at best, guilty of failing to alleviate an aspect of stress and, at worst, torturing the led. Considerations of timelessness should also be seen in the wider context of postings. At management levels above the rank of bombardier, most officers’ and NCOs’ tour lengths are predetermined or at least largely predictable. The soldier’s commitment is often more open-ended; not for him the option of peaking at the optimum time in a tour­ his peaks need to be a constant.

Keeping the soldier informed about timings is an essential component of the wider subject of briefing. If the passage of information is unsatisfactory the soldier can become a victim of the stressful condition of “Learned Helplessness” (i.e. the feeling that he is powerless to predict or control events). This condition is a manifestation of mushroom management; that is to say the soldier is kept in the dark and covered in manure at irregular intervals. To reduce the risk of such stress, management might ask another question of itself: “Have the soldiers been briefed?”

Disrupted relationships have the potential to erode the stability of the soldier’s life. Even the most outspoken soldier generally lies outside the decision­ making process and, therefore has little, if any, influence in the shaping of policy. Yet when there is an appointment change at any level in management the soldier will experience a re-assessment of his own qualities as well as the accumulated effect of the inevitable ‘improvements’ (the higher the level the greater the accumulation as the new ideas gather momentum down the chain). Snyder, in assessing Ardant du Picq, suggests an inter-relationship between such disruption and fear: “Fear is a natural human emotion, he [du Picq] believed, which can only be overcome by ingrained discipline and by the absolute confidence in one’s comrade-in-arms that comes only from long personal association.” Snyder develops this in using du Picq’s words:

“A wise organization insures that the personnel of combat groups change as little as possible,   so that comrades in peacetime manoeuvres shall be comrades in war.”

So, reputable military thinkers appear to have established a firm link between disrupted relationships and combat effectiveness. Although there is an impact on both management and soldiers, there is a case for suggesting that it is greater on the latter. Developing that thought it could also be said that, because of his more intimate involvement, the soldier feels more keenly than management about gaps in his own particular team; he may not be entirely reassured to know, for example, that a vacancy will be filled by a reservist who might not even arrive in time. While management may talk in lofty theoretical terms of acceptable dilution levels, it is the soldier who has to make the greatest adjustment. General Kessler commented on this, in admittedly somewhat extreme terms:

 “When a large number of reservists-that is, men who are strangers to each other, preoccupied with family and business concerns, indifferent to the goal of training the group  are introduced into the unified and compact milieu [of the active regiment], the spirit of the group is changed. It begins to waver and become hesitant. Its moral force disintegrates.”

Disrupted relationships also have an impact on training but there are other factors which ought to be considered. Training should be fun as well as relevant but it produces certain pressures. The pressure of pay underlies individual training and collective training demands that a soldier should do the best for his group (in the widest sense). Such pressures are inevitable and even necessary. Does management, however, contrive to multiply them? For example, management, in the interests of its own career, may want the soldier to ‘get it right’-preferably first time, if so what additional pressure does this introduce? Equally, does interference rather than necessary and helpful supervision prevail? Perhaps worst of all, is premature testing being imposed on the training cycle?

The significance of teamwork has been discussed in idealistic terms. It is, however, an inescapable reality that teamwork is greatly influenced by human relation­ ships; if members of a team do not ‘get on’ that team is likely to founder. The soldier has little or no control over the composition of his team and the Army is a reflection of the polyglot mix of British society (ie there are new human relationship pressures). The Royal Navy used to have a saying “small ship happy ship” which surely presupposed a high degree of intra-team compatibility. If the necessary level of compatibility does not prevail in the less-dense battlefield of the future, the pressure on the soldier may be considerable. Management can have a profound influence on a ‘small ship’ through personal involvement and example. I, for one, would not argue with part of Colonel Shaw’s questionnaire for junior officers: ‘When did you last … Instruct a lesson yourself?’ ‘Make a proper lesson plan?’ or ‘Set an example by teaching well?’

The soldier also needs the stability of sound external relationships. Before joining the Army many soldiers will not have stayed away from home for any length of time, let alone shared a barrack room with unchosen companions. They will be joining an organization which is in many ways outside society, almost a race apart. Indeed, many civilians still retain the view that there is something faintly extra-terrestrial about those of us who are in the Services. This point might be best illustrated by the following extract from a conversation:

Question by the Author:: “Why do you keep looking at me like that?”

University Student: ………(after a pause) “Are you sure you’re in the Army?”

The Author:  “Yes I am.  Why do you ask?”

Student:  “Well, you seem quite normal to me.”

Each time a soldier goes home on leave the gap between him and his civilian friends grows ever wider one girl friend after another marries, the jargon changes, and so on. The soldier can drown in a sea of military ritual and traits, becoming ever more isolated. Admittedly, such considerations are to some extent offset by the fact that most soldiers are essentially gregarious and make new friends with remarkable facility (indeed as I recall while the officer corps was ‘dining at eight’ the boys were down-town and meeting the locals and learning their language over a Stein). None the less, a garrison life (in its widest sense) is an isolated one and many soldiers may experience solitude. Such solitude is exacerbated by what might be termed the Tommy Atkins syndrome which, under the garrison concept, management has little control over.

Whether the Tommy Atkins and extra-terrestrial syndromes could be mitigated by allowing the soldier to live within the community might be a contender for a separate debate. Certainly a more stable home-based army should offer some opportunity in this regard; perhaps we can look forward to the creation of, for example, The Surrey Brigade. Irrespective of where the soldier lays his head management does have a responsibility to take a pastoral interest in his external relationships. Few would take issue with Serve to Lead:

“A deep understanding of each and all of the men under his command, their background and home life, their aspirations, their difficulties, their hopes and fears.”

The realisation of sound relationships and effective teamwork is more likely if the soldier is appropriately placed. A soldier, perhaps having been steered into a choice of arm or service and having that choice confirmed by his SSG assessment, may find himself trapped in a regiment or corps for which he does not feel wholly suited. The feeling of entrapment might be applied in a wider sense, to the Army as a whole. Consider the recruiting advertisement of the early 70s which profiled a serving Corporal who had been to Aden, Gan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and elsewhere the clear message being ‘join the Army and travel to interesting places’. This clarion call did not, however, indicate either that the said Corporal only spent two hours in most of these exotic places en route to his only tour outside Europe (my conjecture) or that he was one of the lucky few (a reality even in the 70s). I am implying that a half truth was told which may have sucked in recruits for the wrong reason and led to them feeling stuck in a cul-de-sac. Furthermore, such incomplete recruiting messages may perhaps camouflage the soldier’s prime raison d’etre: to put his life on the line for his country.

It is assumed that in 1992 our recruiting and selection methods are not only sophisticated but honest; despite that, “square pegs in round holes” are unavoidable. Equally unavoidable may be the sensation of being stuck at the bottom, weighed down by a hefty chain of command with no obvious escape route and no sustainable belief that his views or reservations will ever reach the appropriate management level.

Effective training, good teamwork and stable relationships, both internal and external, all help to prepare the soldier for war and the right mix should help to diminish pre-battlefield stress. Clearly such stress may be the aggregate of most of the factors indicated in Figure 1. Some of which assume greater importance, like the fear of injury with consequential worries about medical support and casualty evacuation plans. This consideration, however, only addresses this stress in relation to the enemy. “Know your enemy” is an old but none the less apposite adage. The reality is, however, that management will always be better informed than the soldier.

A soldier without guidance or information-often incorrectly provided by the media-may overrate or underrate the enemy and either introduces dangers. Moreover, a particular threat from the media is that it tends to focus on single-issue events to the detriment of the picture as a whole; this can sap the resolve of an unprotected soldier. So, with regard to the enemy the ideal balance for the reduction of pre-battlefield stress might be to inculcate in the soldier the thought that ‘we will win but it won’t be easy’’.

As for battlefield stress, this is also largely the product of the other stresses in Figure 1, and in certain regards it could fairly be said that management experiences more of it than does the soldier (for example, greater responsibility stress). The stress for the soldier may result from different pressures, in particular timelessness, the state of the team and the quality of his leaders. Adding equipment to these considerations Major General Richardson, whose thoughts happily accord with those of Du Picq, suggests possible alleviation:

“…..above all, when they are members of a contented unit with confidence in its leaders, each having confidence in his own personal skill as a soldier and in that of his comrades, confidence in his weapons and in the supporting arms.”

There are other facets to the equipment question. When a soldier signs for a piece of equipment, e.g. a vehicle, not only does this frequently represent his first, keenly felt, acceptance of responsibility but also it provides a tangible focus for his attention (often leading to unashamed pride, possessiveness and even emotional involvement). Unnecessary changes of ownership or inadequate spares back-up can rapidly erode these good feelings. Inadequate spares and poor reliability may also gnaw away at his faith in the equipment with which he is destined to fight.

Whatever advantages may accrue from training, teamwork, good equipment and sound relationships, they can be threatened by the malady of boredom. Boredom should not be confused with relaxation and there is an understandable temptation for management to occupy every minute of a soldier’s time lest boredom sets in. Where such occupation is aimless or fruitless management’s measures can be dangerously counter-productive. Boredom can, of course, be debilitating and a soldier is likely to be more prone to it than management. Again Professor Dixon offers some guidance:

“Escape from its [boredom’sJ unpleasant effects, including those of tension and depression, may well be one of the motives which leads people to break their necks climbing or pot-holing or motor-racing. It contributes to most sorts of risk taking, sexual promiscuity and gambling. There is little doubt that it plays a part in terrorism, brinkmanship and going to war Boredom is a potential killer.”

Boredom assumes particular significance in war. Consider the sentry who has been at his post too long perhaps through a managerial oversight. Soldiers have been known to hallucinate the movement of static objects like trees if they have been kept too long in conditions of diminished illumination and this may lead to a form of sensory deprivation which can have unsatisfactory consequences:

“All the normal processes of perception, memory and thinking become progressively impaired. Sometimes the effects are nightmarish ….with too little coming in, too little variety, change or novelty, people become bored, restless and anxious, and then hallucinate.”

It is to be hoped that, in the context of this article, Dr Dixon rather overstates the case. Nonetheless it seems to be an inescapable task for management to achieve a balance between over-supervision and boredom.

One component of boredom is a lack of mental activity, which is more likely to affect the soldier than the manager. The latter, if he is doing his job, should be thinking constantly. Unremitting mental occupation should mean that management is less susceptible to boredom, the vacuous nature of timelessness and, perhaps above all, to fear itself. The impact of a lack of brain activity (not meant in a derogatory sense) needs to be recognised and is yet one more management task. This might give rise to a management question: ‘Have I given the soldier something to look forward to?’ That some­ thing might be represented by simple statements of intent like a CSE show, leave, a battery smoker (aka a piss-up), etc.

It may be surmised that there are other irritating pressures but only one will be offered: the emotive issue of dress. Lord Wolseley wrote: “The better you dress a soldier, the more highly will he be thought of by the women, and consequently by himself “Wolseley’s thought seems to have been largely ignored in the modern British Army. The Soldier’s Number 2 Dress, with its waisted cut (reflecting a traditional near-obsession with the ubiquitous belt) and consequential never-ending need for tailoring, affords little opportunity for pride and hence self-respect. His uniform is the drabbest of all, devoid of any embellishments which bring some relief to the otherwise equally leaden one of his immediate superiors. In considering dress, service women should not be forgotten and, in the absence of guidance from Lord Wolseley on this aspect, a personal view is offered. It seems, at best, somewhat cavalier to expect female soldiers to wear men’s trousers in AD 1992. Perhaps this is merely management’s recognition of where power really lies! Like medals, it could be argued that the uniform is a necessary part of the inducement process and in opening his consideration on the importance of the former Keegan says:

” … and the commander who shrinks from threatening his troops with punishment or who will not deign to bribe or reward them will make easy meat.”

An Overstated Case?

If any readers remain, they have by now probably formulated a view that this contribution is somewhat self-righteous and/or pretentious. With some justification they may also be asking such questions as ‘Is there really an issue here?’, ‘What right has he to form judgements about the pressures on soldiers?’, ‘Has he undertaken any market research?’, ‘Was he not warned by any military editor not to climb aboard any passing fashionable band-wagon as proof of originality’ etc, etc.

Answers might fail to satisfy those challenges but two points are offered at this stage. First, implicit in the Introduction was the intention of redressing the perceived imbalance between the leadership and followership debates. Second, treading a fine line between, on the one hand, over-familiarity and, on the other, ignoring the views of the soldiers, I asked of a soldier with my usual consummate tact: ‘What’s it like to be at the bottom?’

While the views of a lone soldier hardly deserve the accolade of market research the written response raised some interesting points. These are considered below either in summary, for the sake of brevity, or as quoted [Notes to the Author April 1991]:

• I am not a nobody, I have passed both basic and trade training and am at the beginning of a career. I have therefore the satisfaction of achieving some­ thing already. (This is very positive and challenges my earlier contention that a soldier is at the bottom.)
• “Hopefully I will be given the chance by experienced higher ranks of the Army to achieve a lot more.” (No fears about there being no escape but there is an inferred burden on management to provide the necessary guidance and help.)
• People sometimes make the assumption that I do not know anything because I have not been in the Army very long or they ask me to do things that I do not understand and the job takes a long time and I am made to feel foolish. (The perennial difficulty for management of balancing under-estimation and over-estimation of a soldier.)
• The basic training environment was so different to the later reality that I felt unprepared. (The dilemma, insoluble perhaps, of making basic training reflect the outside world of the regiment.)
• At trade training “things were a lot more relaxed, I had a lot more free time and I was having fun and I would think to myself ‘ this feels good’”.  (No confusion here of boredom with relaxation.)
• On the one hand there was a big gap between me as a private soldier and the Lance Corporals in basic training and they laughed at me. They laughed at me in trade training because the way I treated them as something special. On the other hand on occasions I was, for the first time, talked to as if I was a real person-I could not believe it. (The majesty of the chain of command does not seem to have much meaning to the NCOs at the trade training level. Similarly, the awe of the soldier may already be diminishing in trade training, suggesting that this author may have been worrying unnecessarily. A change in management approach as the level of training progresses is totally understandable despite some initial bewilderment in a soldier.)
• “As long as I have respect for higher ranks things are Okay.” (Management please note.)
• “I felt a nervous wreck … as I was going to work with all those officers … I thought to myself these officers will treat me like scum because I am only a Private …” (However benevolent and tolerant management may feel, it is the soldier’s perception which matters. Here the full majesty of the chain of command has introduced pressure or even stress.)
• “! feel that some officers speak to you just to show face.” (A manifestation of the check list approach to leadership indicating that it is difficult to fool a soldier.)
• “I am glad I joined the Army … and I learn new things every day … there is much more for me to achieve, I want to learn and better myself” (Again this is very positive and encouraging. It is to be hoped that the soldier’s superiors will be able to maintain the momentum of this.)
• “I might have been in the Army only for six months but at least I have six months more experience to give to the Army than people that have only just enlisted.” (Again this is both positive and challenges the suggestion that a Private Soldier is truly at the bottom.)

Although I have no evidence to suggest that the soldier’s views are widely shared by others, my feeling is that they may well be. The views offer a curious mixture of self-confidence and positivity, doubts, being over awed by rank but being able to relax with superiors, and a clear perspective of the role of management in achieving career satisfaction.

Where Do We Go From Here?

After disparaging comments about check lists it would be imprudent to produce structured conclusions. This section is therefore devoted to closing this contribution to the debate on followership and trying to put part of the record straight. The latter will be addressed first.

The purpose or this article has not been to carp, manufacture difficulties, criticise management or even to oppose pot-holing. Rather the intention has been to determine some of the concerns of the soldier and to underscore his importance. No doubt these issues are being effectively considered by the appropriate managers but, it seems to me, not either adequately in the public domain or to the same extent as the leadership debate. Since the relevance of this article can only be determined by the soldier it can only claim to be a work of “faction” and it is to be hoped that he will join the debate.

Some will be miffed, others perhaps apoplectic, about the use of the terms management and manager in lieu of the more “macho” leadership and leaders. They have, however, not been used in a disparaging sense and there is a case, in my view, for suggesting that the term management should be more widely accepted and used. The chain of command of a peacetime army should be directing most of its collective effort to management; in a job, rather than a way of life, it is pay, fair discipline, comprehensible allowances, honest pastoral care etc which largely determine the contentment of the soldier. Again, it is stressed that such views do not represent a disbelief in ·the need for, and study of, leadership. Equally, there is nothing unworthy about the tag ‘manager and in many instances it is a more accurate and honest one.

For fear of opening a separate debate, determining the cusp of management and leadership is an issue this article generally avoids. Motivation for war, is however, something which cannot be regarded as a management task; it is a crucial function of leadership and one which was recognized by Raimondo Montecuccoli (The Thirty Years’ War) as a component of the “Exhortation of the host … by depicting the justice of one’s cause …”. Although comparisons with other armed forces are invidious, it is worth recalling a television interview with some US sailors during the build-up to the 1991 Gulf War. To a man, they said that they did not want to fight, which is very understandable-after all who does? More revealing were their (as I recall) unanimous reasons for joining the US Navy: higher education and to improve themselves. This reaction of volunteer Servicemen, distils the “way of life” motivation for joining-up. Ironically, the US forces fought with great distinction with suggests that their leader­ ship successfully exploited the period before the out­ break of hostilities in order to inculcate a belief in a cause. A tenable, believable and just cause is an essential combat motivator, particularly where hostilities are protracted and generating such motivation must surely be one of the hardest leadership tasks.

If management is such an essential component of peacetime soldiering should the Army be adopting lessons and techniques from industry and commerce? After all we are in many ways similar to a large corporation with our own, admittedly powerful, company rules (Manual of Military Law and Queen’s Regulations) whose ultimate sanction must be the envy of many a harassed civilian personnel manager. Consider, for example, Forum Europe’s Upward Assessment system. This system, as I understand it, allows each member of the work force to pose up to five questions of management per year. The subsequent analysis of these questions helps to develop the management training programme within the context of a performance management system.

Some might argue that any consultation contains inherent difficulties such as posing a threat of discipline or failing to satisfy anyone: “Please all and you will please none”.  The cautious might also suggest that if consultation is allowed to develop too far, a form of Group Think might prevail; a situation which has two severe penalties:

“First, groups encourage diffusion of responsibility. Second, the pressure to conform, experienced by members of a group, not only vitiates the advantages of contributions of theoretically independent minds, but fails to provide a safeguard against irrational and sometimes fatal wish­ fulfilment fantasies.”

Those who are uncertain of the merits of listening to the soldier may also suggest other dangers.  For example, consultation might threaten the mystery of the commander, an attribute which Keegan rates highly:

“Orders derive much of their force ji-om the aura of mystery, more or less strong, with which the successful commander, more or less deliberately, surrounds himself; the purpose   of such mystification is to heighten the uncertainty which ought to attach to the consequences of disobeying him.”

Keegan makes the point, however, that mystery should not be confused with distance in either the emotional or physical sense; the chateau generals of 1914-1918 clearly misinterpreted the meaning of mystique. Similarly, consultation might also be seen as a threat of coercion which, again he recognizes as a pre-requisite for command: “Coercion is as essential a component of command as prescription or kinship. Ideally it should remain implicit ...”. A hierarchical organisation like the Army is well protected by discipline and the comforting background presence of Military Law; the commander who has recourse to an overt display of coercion should ponder on the effectiveness of his particular style of leadership. Maybe Keegan identifies the dilemma of the inter-relationship between the chain of command, authoritarianism and coercion:

“Their [modern armies] elaborate hierarchies … act as a system of screens to camouflage the altitude at which dangerous orders are generated It takes much time for a bad or inconsiderate general’s qualities to diffuse downwards through the barrier layers of rank, and even more time for that diffusion to type him or what he is. Even when so typed, he continues to be protected by a parallel mechanism of suppression, the code of military law.”

There are, it would seem, dangers in excessive free­ range consultation. Nevertheless a degree of consultation might mitigate the unnecessary awe in which the chain of command may be held by some soldiers, without either threatening its effectiveness or discipline as a whole.  Consultation may reduce a soldier’s sensation of entrapment and allow him to feel that he is making a tangible contribution to the running of his part of the Army. In turn this might lead to a more relaxed atmosphere which could be highly productive and motivating. Perhaps more importantly, it would allow management to be in touch:

“[Wellington and Grant] … had been keenly alert to the danger qf distancing themselves from reality that even the comparatively primitive technologies and staff systems with which they worked threatened.”

Since the term Followership is intended to represent a soldier’s eye view of management/leadership, much of this debate has focused on the latter. This is inescapable because leader and led are inseparable -they are a team-as may be inferred from General Wilson who wanted “real generals and [real] soldiers“.  Although it is established that the soldier is a precious asset without whom wars cannot be won, sufficient understanding of the plight of management may not have been dis­ played. The manager has a difficult balancing act to perform; an act requiring subtlety, intuition, even­ handedness, emotional commitment and an awareness of his limitations. He is the translator and conduit for orders and instructions to, and at the same time he is the protector of, the soldier and in discharging these responsibilities diligently the stresses on the latter may be reduced. The Figure above suggests, in graphical terms, the desired end-product of effective management which is less awesome to the soldier than the pressures depicted in by a multi-layered chain of command.

It is difficult for management accurately to determine the feelings of the soldier. Some managers started at the bottom of the pile but they are no longer there; memories are selective, subjective and fade, and circumstances change. Other managers were never at the bottom and for them to imagine the soldier’s lot calls for a quantum leap of their imaginations. Perhaps the best we can hope for is that we regularly ask questions of ourselves, for example: ‘Would I follow me?’, ‘Would I like that?’, ‘Do I understand that?’, ‘Do I believe that?’, ‘ Is that fair?’ or ‘Am I seen to be sharing the risks and demands I am placing on my soldiers?.

In war, the last is a crucial question since: ” ….its [command] exercise turns on the recognition that those who are asked to die must not be left to feel that they die alone.” One way to confront these questions is to follow the precept of the Israeli General who reportedly said: “When I give difficult orders I like to do so in person, so that I can meet my soldiers’ eyes” which might prompt one last question: ‘Do I do that?’ Certainly, meeting the soldiers’ eyes may be the ultimate consultation -those uninhibited eyes will pass an honest judgement.

Looking through the eyes of a member of the management team at the problems of followership has proved more difficult than originally envisaged. Although this article does not demonstrate the case, I suspect that followership is more challenging than might be generally supposed; it may even deserve the accolade of: The Art of followership.  Proven, I hope, is the importance of the soldier. In recognising this importance, management should be careful not to under-value or even denigrate (intended or perceived) the follower’s art; ultimately, if that art fails so does the leader. Perhaps above all there should be a recognition that there is more to being led than suggested by Colonel Henderson:

“Recruits, according to this [Henderson’s] ‘Principles of War’, had to be drilled until a disagreeable tendency to think independently had been bludgeoned out. Obedient robots      could then be handed over to an officer and used as an extension of the commander’s     will.”

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Summary of Sources

Kiggell mss. 111/1, Wilson to Kiggell, 15 Sept 1914.

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Hooper G Wellington, (Macmillan & Co Ltd, 1909), p.222.

The Royal Engineer Journal, Lieutenant Colonel Thompson, Sept 1947, quoted in Serve to Lead (An Anthology) (1959), p.69.

Dixon N F, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence, Jonathan Cape, I 976), p.65.

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Middlebrook M, The First Day on the Somme, (Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1971), p.43.

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Quoting Pte Haigh W H, l /5th Yorks and Lanes; p.316.

Divine D The Blunted Sword, Hutchinson, 1964), p.49.

Barnett C The Desert Generals, (Wm Kimber, 1960), p.131.

Simpkin R Race to the Swift, Brasseys, 1985), p.20.

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‘Slim W Courage and Other Broadcasts, (Quoted in Serve to Lead, 1959) p.48.

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Dixon NF Our Own Worst Enemy, Jonathan Cape, 1987), p.168.

Snyder J The ideology of the Offensive, (Cornell University, 1984), pp.57-8.

Quoted from Kessler C. La Patrie Menacce.

Conversation with the Author in a Barnsley Public House, circa 1972.

Serve to Lead (An Anthology, 1959), p. 59.

Richardson FM. Fighting Spirit·–·A Study of Psychological Factors in War, (Leo Cooper, 1978), p. 128.

Wolseley Lord. The Soldier’s Pocketbook (Quoted in Serve to Lead, 1959, p. 54).

Aesop. The Man the Boy and the Donkey, (Fables, 6th Century

Janis IL. Victims of Group Think, (Quoted by Dixon N.F., Our Own Worst Enemy, p. 243).

Winter D. Haig’s Command A Reassessment, (Viking, Penguin Group, 1991), p. 162)