A pig in shit……………..
An Informal Apologia. Much of this piece is based on personal experiences of long ago and, since I neither kept a diary nor have been blessed with a formidable memory, there are bound to be inaccuracies. Further, since many of the events took place forty years ago, it is inevitable that a few flights of fancy will be deployed. Limp apologies are therefore offered for any identified transgressions.
PLANNING
Background Thoughts
Dominic Cummings’s recent mesmeric display of acidity in his contribution to the Commons Science and Technology Committee focused, in large part, on Planning. Since there are so many elements in planning for the future (planning for the past is far too prevalent) it raises the fundamental question: Is a plan intended to provide a fine detail solution, or merely a framework onto which contemporaneous decisions can be made? In my view the latter option is the realistic one which is supported by some greater minds than mine:
“Thou knowest the past but not the future. As to what is future, even a bird with a long neck cannot see it, but God only.” Anonymous
“The future has a way of arriving unannounced.” – George Will
Doubtless there are other quotations that do not support my view but it would be foolhardy to utilise them merely to destroy my case.
Since there is a paucity of long necked birds, it might be sensible to ascertain what qualities are required of a planner and Henry Ford offers a useful thought: “I’m looking for a lot of men who have an infinite capacity to not know what can’t be done.” To me, Ford is suggesting that he seeks open-minded folk who would not glibly dismiss potential planning scenarios unlike a moustachioed Kitchener-esque General Officer Commanding (GOC) in the 1980s who refused to take part in an Exercise because it included anti-UK Government riots and demonstrators in the scenario – his blinkered view was that the whole country would be behind the Government. So, perhaps two modern clichés fit the bill: Blue sky thinking and thinking outside the box. Clichés are useful since they have stood the test of time but surely there need to be boundaries to such thinking options; developing factitious scenarios is a pointless exercise.
Background to Planning
“No plan survives first contact with the enemy” Helmuth van Moltke
The renowned Prussian Military Commander Moltke, succinctly identifies the fundamental challenge of planning as did this piece of Graffito “The best laid plans of mice and men are filed way in a cabinet somewhere”. There are, of course, many subordinate hurdles that produce a deleterious impact on planning, particularly in the military.
Scenarios/Assumptions. As intimated, a balance needs to be struck in developing a multitude of scenarios that inevitably embrace a host of assumptions; on the one hand it would be remiss to overlook a crucial assumption while on the other, equally unhelpful to clutter up the process with options that are as rare as an honest politician, The development of scenarios and assumptions is further complicated by the need for input from other Government Departments, all of which have their own agenda that normally relate to boosting their departmental funding. Superimposed on the development was the internecine warfare between the Single Services who generally jockeyed for a lead role since that often triggered a benefit to their budget and the survival of their existing assets. Thus, from the outset, much effort is devoted to positioning with the aim of accruing additional funding and more influence.
The Planning Staff. The efficacy of handling functional activities is inevitably dependent on the qualities of both the leader and the Staff. Since leadership is discussed to death in most fora, let’s dwell on the Staff. It seems likely that in most large organisations the personnel present a broad mix of quality; not simply ranging from outstanding to poor, but also in terms of aptitude for a particular task (eg, number crunchers are necessary, productive and happy in their work, but are not often seen as leaders). Such considerations translated in the Army[i] to the cream being deployed to what was perceived to be the most demanding roles such as Military Operations – the Directorate of Military Operations (DMO) was the focal point for crisis management and the conduct of operations. Of almost equivalent status lay the Directorate of Staff Duties (SD) which was concerned with identifying the ‘troops to task’ (ie, the assets available to DMO). Below the edge of the sword branches of DMO and SD, lay the important functional areas of planning and training but, it is unlikely that they attracted the top quality.
While the qualities of agile thinking and decisiveness are essential to the process of developing plans there comes a stage when the unwholesome anxiety of reality needs to wag the edge of the sword dog. Two further major restrictions to developing a plan are: money and logistics which are, of course, interrelated. Even the great General Napoleon recognised the importance of the latter in his dictum: “An Army marches on its belly”. In fact so seriously did he take the issue that he went on to say: “Dismiss all incompetent and hang all rascally commissaries, and decrease the number of deaths in the army twenty-five per cent.”
Challenges to Planning
Having discussed in general terms the staffing structure for planning that existed in ‘my day’, it might be worthwhile trying to identify the challenges that the process faces.
Forest Of Plans. Perhaps the old adage of ‘not being able to see the wood from the trees’ is germane. There is inevitably a temptation to generate plans to cover every option, often inspired by those seeking career enhancement, by inventing a new scenario. This is a fruitful area for the ambitious, since it is most unlikely that he or she will ever be in situ when the resultant plan requires activation. Hundreds of plans lay in MOD filing cabinets, requiring updating as the facts change – such as a Foreign Policy Review or, yet another, Defence Review. So, when a particular balloon ascends, the initial reaction is to identify the appropriate plan within that forest and then to determine its validity (eg, is it past its sell-by date?). All this takes time while the emphasis is on speed of response and pressure on and from the edge of the sword fraternity to, at least, produce something. Further, in a freedom of information democracy, there are MSM pressures for an immediate solution to the problem. Even before Moltke’s dictum comes into play, such a melee creates the real possibility of mistakes being made.
Prevailing Circumstances. Plans are inevitably asset driven and the availability of personnel and materiel which impacts severely on the potential efficacy of implementation. The Army made a passing nod to this reality through the creation of War Maintenance Reserve (WMR); however, such allegedly ring-fenced assets were regularly raided to sustain existing commitments. Double-earmarking of assets offered another escapist wheeze to create the illusion that a sufficiency existed to cover commitments. For example, the UKMF(L) – United Kingdom Mobile Force (Land), as a component dedicated to NATO, could not be used on national operations without clearance/approval of the Organisation [See Falklands section below]. The ebb and flow – mostly ebbing – of assets effectively means that any plan is only valid on the day the ink dried.
Making a Name. As already alluded to, the temptation for the ambitious careerist to make a name for him/herself can sometimes be hard to resist. If unchecked, such ambitions can greatly expand the size of the planning forest; they are perhaps tempted by the example of Schlieffen who remains a well-known figure over a hundred years after the formulation of his plan. The drive for immortality did not end all those years ago as witnessed at a Brigadier’s planning conference in the early 1980s. The Author of a plan – Lieutenant Colonel Ballsworthy – briefed the meeting – after which Brigadier Bredwell said: “If this plan succeeds it will be re-titled the Bredwell Plan, if not it will remain as the Ballsworthy Plan”[ii] While diverging into the area of cynical ambition, in the same HQ, the Colonel in charge of a Training Branch, as standard practice, deleted the author’s name on any high quality Brief and replaced it with his own signature block; needless, to say a poor Brief would ascend the chain of command intact, laced with some acerbic comments in red ink. At the risk of stating the obvious, the Colonel secured his promotion!
Personnel Turnover. In both political and military contexts personnel change with disconcerting rapidity which means a loss of knowledge as well as either historical background or plan implementation experience. In the former case the tenure of a Secretary of State, for example, is inherently unpredictable; whereas the military posting cycle is predictable which allows for the cynical incumbent to devote the first year to blaming his/her predecessor and the second year to be ‘preparing for handover’. As for the military, in theory, any relevant experience to the task in hand should be in the bailiwick of the more senior officers; but in the case of politicians there is no such back-up of experience system although the Civil Service, again in theory, should be able to offer some experience gleaned from previous events.
Margaret Thatcher famously stated that “every Prime Minister needs a Willie” which is perhaps what the current untried, inexperienced Cabinet needed in the early days of handling the Covid crisis. Willie Whitelaw offered a long arm of experience to the PM and was blessed with the good fortune to have been underestimated by friend and foe alike, by adhering to Alec Douglas-Home’s advice: ‘’It is always better to be thought of as stupider than you really are than as cleverer than you really are.” At every level, discarding staff on grounds of age should be carefully considered before opting for removing personnel. In my first MOD Tour somewhere in the bowels of the Ministry lay a 68 year-old retired Lieutenant Colonel who alone understood an essential accounting procedure from which crucial operational decision-making could be made. Not only did any ‘talented’ officer fail to understand the process but also recognised it to be an unsexy appointment and so not a useful route for promotion. Every year a case was presented to the appropriate Board for the Colonel’s retention.
Allow me to offer one final example of the consequences of rapid staff turnover. The Commander British Forces Falkland Islands (BFFI) sent a signal to our HQ pleading for a Staff Visit; clearly the FI felt unloved being on the other side of the world. In due course, Nicholson was nominated to undertake the said visit. When the flight details had been arranged our HQ signalled the details to BFFI which elicited this reply: “Who is Lieutenant Colonel Nicholson and why is he visiting us?” In the subsequent exchange of signals BFFI was reminded that the visit had been organised in response to their request and the trip went ahead. Why had this situation occurred? Quite simply in the period between request and visit, not only had the Commander changed but also most of his key Staff. In the event, Nicholson got pissed in the brand new Officers’ Mess on Ascension Island, spent three days on a Battlefield Tour of FI, returning to the Port Stanley Bar at each day’s close of play and found no requirement to make a single note for further action.
The elixir for the manning of any organisation must surely rest with the balance between experience on the one hand while, on the other, imaginative thinking backed by intellect plus the drive and energy of the ‘up and coming’ (I eschew the word progressive!). Maybe Dean Inge articulated the balance issue better than me: “There are two kinds of fools. One says ‘This is old; therefore, it is good’ The other says ‘This is new; therefore, it is better.’’.
Lessons Learnt. The current clamour for an immediate inquiry into the handling of the Covid crisis may well be more about political gain from an army of unforgiving critics. Having lived through a good number of events that necessitated a Post Exercise Report (PXR), it must be said that conducting one while in the fray of handling a demanding situation, let alone a genuine crisis, the last imposition needed is that of examining the entrails of an on-going experience. By all means keep a diary for the PXR to support the evidential chain of signals, E-Mails and Orders but the over-riding need is to get on with the job in hand and not to be deflected from it.
For a number of reasons, I remain cynical about the long-term benefits of a PXR or Inquiry. First, it is human nature to unwind as the adrenalin subsides which is often coupled with a desire to move on or put the experience on the back-burner of one’s life. Second, too often Reports ask for a dream sheet of investment, such as more manpower and equipment which, with the best economic will in the world, will never be implemented. Third, many of those will be literally moving on, taking the benefit of their experiences with them – the ultimate tragedy with regard to benefitting from the lessons learnt.
My cynicism surrounding the value of PXRs may have been spawned from the artful behaviour of one of my Commanding Officers who proved adept at discovering, prior to the event, what the Gunnery Staff (GS) and Directing Staff (DS) were planning to say at the de-briefing. Armed with that knowledge he would advise the GS/DS of the issues that he had identified for resolution leaving the latter the only option of saying: “The Commanding Officer has identified this and remedial action has already been taken”. What a player – little wonder he became a General.
Exercising Plans. Where possible important plans should be practised; for large scale national plans this generally takes the form of a Staff Exercise – manning an Operations Room and reacting to a scripted scenario. When resources allow, some exercises can involve the deployment of some personnel but rarely, if ever, involving all the players needed for real (life has to go on and all have day jobs). An underlying problem is that the key players can generally find other pressing commitments which prevent their participation in such exercises.
Command and Control. From the perspective of both the players and those affected by the event in hand, it is essential to have a Boss. He/she must be the person in the driving seat who not only has the ultimate responsibility for the implementation of a plan but also for developing it whether it be an amended/updated plan or merely executing an existing plan in full – unlikely as that may be. As far as the Covid crisis is concerned, the Secretary of State appears to fit the bill although some dilution of certainty occurs with the devolution of some major decisions to the Secretary of State For Transport. Overall the nation appears to know where the blame or credit lies: Matt Hancock is the man supping the poison chalice. Below the Health Secretary however there is a raft of agencies that the public undoubtedly feel are merely adding to the fog of the Covid war. Popping out of the woodwork are such bodies as Public Health England[iii], the Vaccine Task Force and a raft of Royal Colleges that all seem determined to be heard by the public. Superimposed on all these areas are the variations of decision-making by the different national Governments which included an unpleasant tendency to introduce a competitive element.
REAL LIFE EXPERIENCES
Background. My experience of real challenges embrace: The Firemen’s Strike; The Oil Tanker Drivers’ Strike; and the Falkland Islands (FI) Campaign. I was intimately involved in the first two but on the periphery of the FI Campaign planning. As already declared, I did not keep a diary for any of them.
“I find this officer dull and uninteresting” Major General JW Stanier
After a lapse of fifteen years, I managed to read Stanier’s closing comment on my Staff College Report; clearly a man of vision since, during my year at the College, we did not exchange a single word. Like many, I had other brushes with the reporting system including a very rare high graded version that included these words: “This officer is disloyal”; on pointing out the conflict between a report that exceeded all my expectations and the lack of a basic requirement of an officer, namely loyalty, the Commanding Officer asked me to go away and come back in an hour. During that period the Report had been totally re-typed (the unacceptability of Snopake and the lack of word processors then, made that the only amendment option). In the re-draft “disloyal” had been replaced with “argumentative” which seemed fair.
A second brush with the reporting system came a few years later when a Brigadier, unbeknownst to me, had tried to insert this in my Report: “This officer is off-hand and casual”. We had met once when, as PMC, I handed him a pen to sign the visitors’ book. How’s that for instant judgement! Luck determined that another Brigadier had the remark expunged, accompanied with the warning to me: “keep your head down”. Feeling hard done by when compared to the fate of others would be futile such as this on a Major:
CO: I recommend this Officer for promotion.
Brigadier (aka the Senior Reporting Officer): I agree with the Commanding Officer’s recommendation, however this officer will be on the bottom of any promotion list I produce”.
The half-seen reporting system of those days was cruel in raising expectations that were often secretly dashed by the SRO. Anyway, aside from Stanier’s astute assessment of a Gunner officer who had no interest in equitation, on pit-head disaster day (the revelation of the next job after Staff College) I had no expectation of being placed in a top tier post. Sure enough, the slip of paper in my brown envelope informed me of the next appointment: DAA&QMG(c), MOD, Main Building. Bemused by the appointment title I asked the DS what it meant. He replied “No idea”.
It transpired that the(c) meant I had a desk by the window while the role required me to interface with the Logistic element such as the RCT and the RAOC on the one hand and the General Staff (GS) on the other, who definitely had little desire to speak to logisticians. During the takeover we ambled around Old War Office building meeting logisticians of every shape and hue who, within a week, not only de-camped to Andover but also changed both their titles and functions. Until the Firemen’s strike I had little idea of the pain that such a re-deployment would cause, particularly for an officer who knew little of, and had minimal interest in, logistics. Since Staff College focused on edge of the sword matters like tanks, artillery, mortars, infantry etc the subject of logistics rarely featured; at the end of syndicate discussions (the training mainstay of the College) the DS would invariably close his briefing folder and say: “We don’t have time to discuss logistic support”.
Firemen’s Strike. Other than the identification of manpower plus an element of basic fire-fighting training, response to this industrial action lay predominantly with logistics, including medical support. Once the manpower had been identified by SD, it became almost entirely a logistics operation resulting in minimal interference from friendly forces; MO for example, had a widespread portfolio handling NATO and Out of Area commitments and would not have wished for detailed involvement in a Strike. Of course there was a need for some basic training, particularly on the operation of the Green Goddesses and bespoke fire-related 1st Aid.
Was there a plan? There may well have been a plan although I never saw one. It is likely that with the lengthy build-up to strike action time there was aplenty to develop a plan within the general framework of a MACA (Military Aid to the Civil Authorities) operation. The senior body handling the operation was, as I recall, the CCU (Civil Contingencies Unit). Below that the MOD speedily formed an ad hoc Committee under the Chairmanship of an AUS (Assistant Under Secretary). That Committee met regularly, if not daily, and was blessed with a charming Irishman in the Chair who got things done by dint of his calm personality.
For most, if not all, of us the Strike offered a unique event so planning began with a blank sheet of paper. Other than the obvious common-sense measures of identifying deployment locations, deploying the Green Goddesses, allocating rations, releasing certain equipments from stores, creating a chain of command to integrate the military into the Governmental structures (local and national) etc, handling the Strike became a reactive process; it would have been unwise for the military to take the initiative in such a politically sensitive issue. The media played a leading and influential role in the handling of the Strike.
It emerged at the first AUS’s meeting, that every Green Goddess by Law, had to be fitted with a blue flashing lamp; the task of purchasing them lay with Nicholson. A post meeting flip through the Yellow Pages soon identified a commercial provider of the lamps. As the days turned into weeks, largely through media pressure, the MOD went down a route of relatively lavish spending on quality of life enhancements for the deployed troops, such as TVs. As winter began to bite, Nicholson received approval to purchase 10,000 Jackets; this, the final large-scale expenditure, took place a few days before the end of the Strike and, as I recall, were never deployed.
These were heady days with, largely unjustified, praise being heaped on all the AUS Team; ‘unjustified’ because the need to ‘win’ the Strike meant that expenditure was unfettered. For every item of expenditure we simply said to the provider: “Send the Bill to the Home Office”. Financial power without responsibility is a doddle! As for the never deployed Donkey Jackets, they may well still be held in an Ordnance Depot, still housed in sealed boxes.
Immensely satisfying as it was to be the recipient of unmerited praise, the hours were long and commuting to work began to take its toll. When I arrived in the Directorate the General had denied me Inner London Lodging Allowance (ILLA) on the grounds that I was not part of an essential MOD Department, such as DMO or ASD, and did not need either to work late or be on call (as an Operations snob the General felt that he had been miscast working in a logistics Directorate). After four days of working 18 hours a day my boss bravely represented my case for ILLA to which the General replied: “Nicholson may have a case get him to write a paper justifying it” – just what one needed during a crisis!
Oil Tanker Drivers Strike. As with the Firemen’s Strike, the potential for an oil tanker drivers’ dispute featured a long gestation cycle. Our department’s role seemed to be limited to monitoring MOD fuel holdings and ultimately to consider all possible variations of the strike action with the former offering the most time-consuming role.
As the lead branch for the dispute, it fell to the Army to present Tri-Service fuel holdings and predicted consumptions to the CCU. The Royal Navy with fewer locations did not present a challenge and the RAF with its state-of-the-art ADP system known as Air Staff Management Aid (ASMA) were ahead of the game in providing digestible information. The Army proved to be another matter requiring regular signals to all units with fuel holdings to dip their tanks every day and to report those holdings, accompanied by estimates of how many days of consumption remained. Such detailed work of collating statistics did not appeal, the more so since few departments were involved and therefore the teamwork feel of the Firemen’s Strike did not prevail.
Sitting in the office late on a Friday, a telephone call revealed a requirement to provide a brief immediately for a CCU Meeting due to take place first thing on the following Monday. Aside from a Clerk and Nicholson, the entire Directorate had departed for the week-end so force majeure ruled and I settled down to imagine possible variations of the strike: for example: Would all companies strike? Would only Shell or BP strike? etc. So, with a soupçon of imagination it proved possible to generate a superficially impressive list of permutations and combinations. The Clerk typed the results and off went the Brief to the Cabinet Office.
Nothing more happened until the following Tuesday when I noticed an unrevised version of that Friday Brief in the Float File, written on Cabinet Office notepaper. The discovery of that raised my morale to new heights. A back of a fag packet product had winged through the MOD like shit through a goose and had passed muster without amendment. Such is the punching cotton wool pace of the staffing process, had the General, the Brigadier, the Colonel et al been present that fateful Friday afternoon, it’s likely that it would have become a working week-end.
Falklands. As a peripheral member of the SD Branch during the build-up of the FI Campaign, I witnessed the process while not taking any active part. As a Royal Navy led operation the Army Department’s efforts focused on identifying and assembling Troops To Task and thereafter hastily arranging a training programme. The challenge seemed to be the creation of a viable Brigade with the ultimate solution being the reconstitution of 5 Brigade to include two Guards Battalions, at that time deployed on public duties. If nothing else, a hastily manufactured Brigade needed some experience of unit and sub unit interoperability and a training exercise resulted.
Not being involved in the Order of Battle decisions comment on them might be regarded as impertinent. However, I was well aware of the long hours of Staff work that went into forming 5 Brigade. As the cobbling together of the Brigade had almost reach fruition, the Chief of the General Staff (CGS) popped into the office and announced that he had the perfect solution – deploy the UKMF (L). The United Kingdom Mobile Force (Land) had been assigned to NATO and could not be used for a national deployment without the Organisation’s approval. CGS may well have come up with the ideal solution but the real question on everyone’s lips was: Why did ne not suggest that on Day 1? It remains unanswered – I think!
SO WHAT?
If the claim were to be made that valid conclusions could be drawn from the foregoing random thoughts, I would probably stand accused of being pretentious
It is probably safe to suggest that there needs to be a balance between excessive planning and inadequate planning. The planning process for most complex operations involves different ministries and many departments within them. Aside from bespoke planning departments, those populating such organisations have their ‘day jobs’ to pursue and are not either enthused by, or interested in, contributing to planning for events that, with luck, may never happen. In any staffing process the more interested parties there are, the more time-consuming it is.
Superimposed on the structural challenges of the staffing process, is the reality that circumstances change, often rapidly which can render a plan obsolescent the day the ink has dried. In three tours, I experienced a major Defence Review during each one. As a matter of course, changes are made to: assets, manpower, key staff and command appointments, E-Mail addresses, telephone numbers and appointment titles.
A predecessor put it to me that Staff College training had little value to those selected to work either in the MOD or a major HQ, whereas total familiarity with the MOD Telephone Directory was a ‘must’. Nobody knows everything and the interdependence of running an operation necessitates dealing with many other points of contact – as the old advertising mantra used to say: I know a man who knows. So, following the Moltke principle, even the highest quality plan will fail if those points of contact detail are inaccurate.
It has been suggested that the Planning Departments are not manned by the top tier of talent. The 1st XI is deployed to those departments that execute the plans; they are the decisive folk with agile brains who add flesh to the plan skeleton. The talent, experience and training of the 1st XI allows for the speedy development of a plan. Further, a pound to a pinch, when a particular balloon goes up the instinctive human reaction is to ‘get on with it’, rather than ‘do we have a plan?’ So, bearing such thoughts in mind, my preference lies with skeletal or framework plans which offer the foundation for the development of a relevant plan. Matt Hancock hinted at the skeletal approach in his recent evidence to the Parliamentary Select Committee when he revealed that plans existed for Flu, Ebola and others but not for a Covid pandemic. He suggested however, that those ‘wrong’ plans included certain framework actions relevant to other crises (eg, a Draft Bill ready for submission to the House).
A case might be made for some or all of the following to be considered when contingency planning:
· Plans need to be tested under conditions that are as realistic as possible which, therefore, must include participation by key players.
· Experienced folk are needed in the process (The Willie Principle)
· A shorter chain of command can speed up the decision-making process but this needs to be balanced with allowing relevant input from a wider field
· There should be no doubt about who is responsible for what. Too many lead bodies in an open society sows confusion and, in the case of Covid, the bewildered public had to contend with the: NHS, Public Health England, Royal Colleges, Parliamentary Committees et a.l
· Writing a Report on the activation of a plan while it is still in progress is not helpful.
· In the modern just in time world stockpiling is viewed with suspicion by the Treasury and selecting the right item to store would always be a challenge. That said, items such as Personnel Protection Equipment (PPE) which are relevant to more than one scenario, might usefully be stockpiled as part of the supply chain.
[i] Being out of the Army system for over 25 years, the functional titles, such as SD, may have been discarded for more edgy PC ones but the principles of selection for role remain the same. Circa the 1980s, Budgets began to play a greater role in military matters and since fighting for money between the Services was an important issue, the Staff selected are also of the highest order although that was not necessarily the case with those selected to serve on the Central Staffs – after all even I served there..
[ii] The story is true but, for obvious reasons, the names have been changed.
[iii] As a result of the Covid pandemic the Government has already stated that some reorganisation will take place.
Leave a Reply
You must be logged in to post a comment.